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ABSTRACT 
 
Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other 
communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured 
intentional action and mutual mind-reading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities 
in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect 
unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest progress in identifying 
analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) 
production of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches 
investigating communication across sensory modalities.  To move forward, we argue a framework 
fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into 
a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be 
met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps 
elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to better 
clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. 
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I. Language is considered to be one of the pinnacles of human biological evolution (Fitch 2010). Its 
emergence in the Homo lineage was presumably enabled by the presence of a set of cognitive abilities 
and ecological conditions not shared by other species. One candidate for these abilities is the capacity 
to act with, and understand, communicative intentions. The philosopher of language, Paul Grice (1957, 
1982), was pivotal in highlighting the importance of such a psychological framework for 
communication and many authors working in the ‘Gricean’ tradition have followed him in arguing 
that the ability for intentional communication requires a sophisticated, pre-existing, metapsychological 
framework in which speaker and hearer (or signaler and receiver) mutually understand one another’s 
intentions and beliefs (Sperber & Wilson 1995, Sperber 2000, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015a). 
 
Within Grice’s influential analysis of speaker meaning there exist three clauses (Strawson 1964, Jacob 
1997), the conjunction of which form the basis for Grice’s theory of communication. For a signaler, S, 
to mean something via utterance x requires that: i) S intends that S’s utterance of x induce a response, r, 
in receiver, R; ii) S intends that R recognises that S has intention (i), and iii) S intends that R’s 
recognition of S’ intention functions at least partly in the motivation for R’s response, r.  On this 
account, we not only intend to influence the receiver (through the production of a stimulus) when 
communicating, we also want them to recognise that we are acting with such intentions, and respond 
on the basis of recognising this. In linguistic pragmatics this communication of intention (surmised by 
these three clauses) is often referred to as ostensive or Gricean communication and the reiterated 
mutual perspective taking that underlies this process has consequently been highlighted as a defining 
feature of human linguistic communication (e.g. Grice 1982, Dennett 1983, Sperber and Wilson 1995, 
Sperber 2000, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 2015a). 
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Given the proposed centrality of Gricean characterisations of communication (Grice 1957) to human 
communicative interaction, questions have been raised as to the uniqueness of these aspects of human 
language.  The extent to which human and non-human animal communication could involve the same 
underlying psychological framework has been debated (Gomez 1994, Tomasello 2008, Scott-Phillips 
2015a, b, Moore 2015a). One reason for this is that on standard accounts (Dennett 1983, Sperber 
2000), Gricean communication requires that communicators are capable of entertaining very complex 
metarepresentations – that is, representations of others’ mental states. Dennett (1983, 1988) played a 
critical role in initial attempts to operationalise animals as intentional systems by differentiating 
between various orders of the metarepresentational complexity that intentional communication 
requires, based on Grice’s analysis (Dennett 1983). Zero-order intentionality attributes no mentality or 
intention to the communicative signalling of animals. First-order intentionality requires that the 
signaler intends to signal to produce a response in the recipient, but does not require that the recipient 
recognise this. Second-order intentionality involves complementing the intention to signal with the 
attribution of mental states (by the recipient to the signaler); whilst third- order intentionality requires 
that the signaler intend for the recipient to attribute to her the intention to signal. Finally, fourth-order 
intentionality requires that signaler and recipient, alike, represent both the signaler’s goal and her 
intention that the recipient recognise that goal (Dennett 1983, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Scott-Phillips 
2015a,b).  
 
Although this operationalisation would appear to serve as a useful guide to identifying what type of 
intentionality an animal communicative system displays, it has also generated problems related to 
what the levels of intentionality represent. As Dennett has noted, both first and higher orders of 
intentionality require that an act of signalling is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way. 
However, second order intentionality (and beyond) likely employs cognitive mechanisms of a 
qualitatively different kind - since it requires that both signaler and recipient engage in some form of 
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mental state attribution. For this reason, second order intentionality has received most interest because 
it has been generally considered as more “human” or, as Grice highlighted, as more indicative of “true” 
linguistic communication (Grice 1957) and hence a step further along the continuum towards human 
language (Scott-Phillips 2015a). One major consequence is that it has since become common-place to 
assume that in order to demonstrate convincing evidence that animal vocal production is intentional 
and thus relevant to human language, at the very least, an attribution of mental states during vocal 
communication is required.  
 
This emphasis of mental state attribution is unhelpful for two reasons. Firstly, whilst adult humans are 
competent at reiterated mental-state attribution, there is evidence that younger children find high 
orders of metarepresentation difficult (Wimmer & Perner 1983, Liddle & Nettle 2006). Some working 
in primate cognition have therefore argued that, if standard interpretations of Grice are right, then 
Gricean communication would be too difficult for both animals and human children. If this is correct, 
then standard interpretations must overstate the cognitive pre-requisites of Gricean communication 
(Gomez 1994, Moore 2014, 2015a,b) – and human and animal communication may share a common 
psychological framework after all. The less-intellectualised approaches to human communication are 
supported by the argument that even in adults, speech production and interpretation seems not to 
always require inference computation or belief ascription about speaker intentions (Millikan 1984). 
Furthermore, experimental studies under controlled conditions have repeatedly demonstrated that 
mind-reading is not deployed automatically during social and communicative situations (Keysar et al. 
2003, Apperly et al. 2006) and is even sometimes impeded by the surrounding social environment 
(McClung et al. 2013). 
 
A second reason for resisting the mental state attribution approach is that it risks obscuring the goals 
of comparative psychology and biology. The comparative approach does not aim to show that animals 
communicate in a way that fully equates to human communication; instead it aims to elucidate 
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evolutionary precursors of crucial components of human language (Seyfarth et al. 1980, Zuberbühler 
2005). The comparative study of semantics, for example, does not hinge on the discovery of symbolic 
conventions, displaced in time and space from the referents of communicative behaviour (Tomasello 
2008). In that case, to try to evaluate what other animals are doing by human standards is to risk 
failing to do justice to their abilities. A more theory-neutral approach to studying intentional 
communication would therefore be better.  
 
In line with this idea, over the last ten years Byrne, Hopkins, Leavens, Tomasello, and colleagues have 
taken a less theory-laden approach to intentionality. This approach sidesteps the requirement that 
intentional communication involves understanding the minds of others and does not assume that 
intentional use of communicative signals involves the sorts of ‘ostensive-inferential’ communication 
that thinkers in the Gricean tradition have argued characterises human communication. Through 
borrowing behavioural markers implemented by developmental psychologists to distinguish between 
reflexive and more intentional gestural communication in children (Bates et al. 1979), progress has 
been made in identifying traits that are precursors to distinctively human intentional communication 
systems (Leavens et al. 2005, Liebal et al. 2006). In a similar way to humans, non-human primates, 
primarily great apes, also communicate with each other by gesturing. Observations of the production 
of gestures suggest that they fulfil a number of the criteria specified for intentionality in 
communicative signals (table 1). Individuals have, for example, been observed to take into account the 
attention state of the receiver, only gesturing when selected receivers are appropriately attentive 
(Leavens et al. 2005), and to elaborate or change signal if their initial signal fails to reach the apparent 
goal (Cartmill and Byrne 2007). By avoiding the question of mental state attribution, and by focusing 
on behavioural markers of flexible and goal-directed communication, an array of studies have 
demonstrated first order intentionality in the communication of our closest living relatives (Call & 
Tomasello 2007, Pika & Liebal 2012, Byrne 2016). 
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Table 1: The criteria for intentional communication in animals pertinent to step 2 in the new 
framework. Amended from Schel et al. (2013).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, there exists some variation in the criteria of intentionality that individual studies apply to 
gestural signals and rarely has there been an attempt to apply all criteria to a single signal in a study 
species (but see Leavens et al. 2004). Moreover, each individual marker of intentionality in isolation 
can be explained through lower-level mechanisms, without needing to invoke intentionality. For 
example, sensitivity to the attention state of the receiver could simply be a learned discrimination 
where signals are only produced when a receiver’s face can be seen; persistence of a signal may have 
nothing to do with an intention to communicate with an as yet unresponsive receiver, but simply that 
signal production is emotionally driven and only when the goal is met does the underlying emotion 
change and terminate signal production (Liebal et al., 2013, Gaunet & Massioui 2014, Savalli et al. 
Criterion Explanation 
Social use The signal is directed at a recipient. This can be assessed at various 
levels: 
1. Presence/absence audience effect: the signal is only produced in 
the presence of a recipient. 
2. Composition of audience: the signal is only produced in the 
presence of certain recipients (e.g., kin, dominants, friends) 
3. Behaviour of audience: signal production is contingent on the 
behaviour of the recipient 
Sensitivity to 
attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Visual signals are only produced in the field of view of recipients. If 
signaler does not have a recipient’s visual attention, tactile or auditory 
signals should be produced. This can also be considered a level (3) of 
audience effect. 
Manipulation  
of attentional 
state of 
recipient 
Before a visual signal is produced, attention-getting behaviours are 
directed towards a recipient who is not visually attending to the signaler 
or the signaler moves itself into the line of view of a recipient (Liebal et 
al. 2004). 
Audience 
checking and 
gaze 
alternation 
Signaler monitors the audience and visually orients towards the recipient 
before producing a signal. If a third entity is involved, gaze alternation 
may occur between recipients and this entity. 
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2014). Therefore, it is important, before invoking first order intentionality, to demonstrate convergent 
evidence from a number of markers of intentionality for the same signal and species (Liebal et al. 
2013, though see Vail et al. 2013). Although multiple cases of converging evidence do not amount to a 
proof, the probability of a behaviouristic explanation decreases. 
 
 Whilst gestural studies highlight potential phylogenetic precursors to the intentional communication 
of humans and provide crucial comparative data, similar evidence from vocal communication studies 
has not been considered as equally convincing. Despite numerous attempts, researchers have failed to 
teach enculturated apes to produce spoken language (Yerkes and Yerkes 1929, Hayes 1951). As their 
vocalisations are commonly produced in specific contexts, it has been traditionally assumed that 
vocalisations are the product of low level emotional processes and are best characterised as 
involuntary responses to specific stimuli rather than voluntary, goal-directed signals (Dennett 1983, 
Notman & Rendall 2005, Tomasello 2008). Furthermore, invasive procedures have shown that call 
initiation in monkeys is mediated by limbic rather than cortical structures in the brain (Jurgens 1992).  
On the other hand, some studies suggest that vocal and non-vocal sounds are used intentionally. 
Leavens, Hopkins and colleagues have shown that great apes use voiced and unvoiced sounds in a 
controlled manner that implies flexibility and intentionality (Russell et al. 2005, Hopkins et al 2007, 
Hostetter et al. 2007, Hopkins et al. 2011). More recent studies, under natural conditions, have 
provided additional support for intentionality in ape vocalisations (Crockford et al. 2012, 2015, Schel 
et al. 2013). Moreover, multiple studies have shown vocalisations to be dependent on the surrounding 
social audience in a variety of species (Marler et al. 1986, Zuberbühler 2008, Crockford et al. 2012). 
These so called “audience effects” are not solely due to simple, arousal mediated, social facilitation 
effects (Zajonc 1965), as might be the case when examining the presence or absence of conspecifics 
(Tomasello 2008). Instead, they incorporate more subtle social and behavioural variations, e.g. 
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relationship quality (Slocombe et al. 2010, Mazinni et al. 2013, Schel et al. 2013,) or response of 
receivers (Wich and de Vries 2006).  
 
Despite this body of data, the existence of intentional vocal communication in animals is still disputed 
(Tomasello 2008). Given the central role intentionality plays in human language and the apparent 
disparity between the intentional production of gestures and non-intentional vocalisations in non-
human primates, it has been argued that language must have evolved via a gestural, rather than a vocal, 
route (Corballis 2002, Tomasello 2008). This theoretical reasoning certainly adds fuel to the fiery 
debate surrounding language’s evolutionary emergence. But unfortunately it fails to consider the fact 
that the researchers working with gestures and vocalisations, respectively, are operating from different 
bases (Slocombe et al. 2011). Animal vocal communication researchers are investigating how the 
production of vocalisations may or may not be used to influence the mental states of receivers, often 
with negative results (Rendall et al. 2000; but see Crockford et al. 2012, Schel et al. 2013). By contrast, 
gestural communication researchers are using an in-place suite of behaviours, derived from child 
developmental work, to address how goal-directed and hence intentional (Dennett’s first order 
intentionality) gestural production is, predominantly in primates. This means that the research into 
vocalisations tacitly employs a more demanding criterion for intentionality than the research into 
gestures. As a result, comparing intentional production of animal signals at different levels in the two 
different modalities commits the mistake of not comparing like with like, and hence renders it difficult 
to draw reliable conclusions about differences in intentionality across these modalities.  
 
To resolve these conceptual and methodological difficulties we propose to ‘level the playing field’ 
with an updated framework in which the intentional nature of animal communication, irrespective of 
modality, can be operationalised and systematically assessed. A single framework approach will 
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facilitate direct comparative work amongst species and communicative mediums, providing a more 
holistic picture of the evolution of human intentional communication. 
 
II. The new framework 
The framework that we propose consists of three distinct criteria, each of which needs to be met by a 
signal type before intentionality is ascribed to it. We do not abandon consideration of cognitive 
components to intentionality, but instead argue that questions about whether or not vocal 
communication is produced voluntarily and in a goal-directed way can be answered independently of 
questions about whether signaler and receiver are engaged in mind-reading. Therefore, we return to 
goal-directedness and its role in intentional behaviour as the first criterion requiring satisfaction. 
 
Animal S intentionally communicates I to receiver R if the following three propositions all hold: 
 
1) S acts with a goal with the content I 
Goal directed behaviour has been a central focus of comparative psychology research over the last 
three decades. At a more rudimentary level the notion of goal-direction involves the role of motor-
processes organising action towards physical targets (Kenward et al. 2009). However, goal-
directedness has also been implicated in intentional behaviour, as opposed to automatic or habitual 
behaviour (Heyes and Dickinson 1990). Here it is necessary to show that the goal-directed behaviour 
is based upon knowledge of the relationship that exits between the action and its consequences (Wit & 
Dickinson 2009). Hence within our new framework we shift the cognitive emphasis to demonstrating 
that communication is goal-directed.  
 
Whilst we appreciate that operationalisation of goal-directedness is not straightforward, it is a far more 
tangible and relevant criterion than the demonstration of mental state attribution. Previous studies 
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probing the intentionality of primate gestures have emphasised the role of persistence and elaboration 
in identifying goal-directedness. In line with this, we argue that goal-directedness can be empirically 
investigated more generally by merging these criteria with the identification and application of 
‘stopping rules’ (Burkart et al. 2015). When a signaler possesses a goal for its communication, it 
would stop upon reaching the goal, but persist and/or elaborate the signal when the goal is not reached 
(Leavens et al. 2005). Thus, as with any other behavioural data, regular and reliable observations 
fulfilling the criteria (e.g. a goal-dependent cessation of communication, or indeed persistence and 
elaboration in the absence of the goal being met) are critical to demonstrating the presence of a goal, 
causally linked with the signal. Furthermore, experimental manipulation of goal end states leading to 
premature or delayed goal accomplishment is an additional, complementary way, to assess the causal 
link between the goal and the communicative signal. 
 
2) S produces voluntary, recipient directed signals as a means to reach the represented goal 
We agree with Leavens et al. (2004) and Moore (2015b) that to show intentionality, behaviour must be 
under volitional control and recipient-directed.  Criteria generated from studies of intentional 
communication in infants (Bates et al. 1979) represent a valuable set of measures to address these 
conditions (see table 1). One indicator of voluntary control is selective use of the signal, and in 
particular, selectively producing or withholding a signal in response to social factors such as audience 
composition and behaviour (social use). As we highlighted above, social context could in principle be 
part of a complex stimulus to which an automatic, innate signal production mechanism responds. Thus 
Hurford (2007, page 232) argues that only if ‘circumstances under which calls are given are too 
implausibly complex to be hardwired into the genes’ should we infer these signals are voluntary. 
Indicators of the recipient-directed nature of a signal include social use, audience checking and 
sensitivity to attentional state (Ristau 1991, Povinelli et al. 2003, Liebal et al. 2004, Leavens et al. 
2005, Schel et al. 2013). Every signal type and study species is different. So, whilst it has been 
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suggested that the more criteria satisfied the greater the confidence that a signal is indeed intentional 
(Schel et al. 2013), this may not always be plausible (e.g. certain criteria apply only to the visual 
domain). Thus we would argue for a strict a priori selection procedure of criteria to ensure fair 
comparisons across species and modalities. 
 
3) S’s signaling behaviour changes the behaviour of R in ways conducive to realising I 
As the last condition for intentionality, we focus on the behaviour of the receiver with respect to the 
signal produced. Given our shift of focus away from signaler or receiver mental state attribution we 
only require that the communicative behaviour of the signaler elicits a change in the behaviour of the 
receiver. To rule out the pitfall of simply treating any behavioural change in the receiver as sufficient 
for intentionality, we strengthen our condition by specifying that the change in the receiver’s 
behaviour must be repeatable, consistent and in line with the apparent intentions of the signaler.  
In order to demonstrate how our conditions can be operationalised, we shall now interpret data from a 
recent study on the alarm calling behaviour of chimpanzees within the new framework and assess its 
intentionality. 
 
An example of intentionality in vocal communication assessed with the proposed criteria 
In a similar way to many primate and non-primate species, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes 
schweinfurthii) produce vocalisations when faced with dangerous situations (e.g. python or leopard 
presence, inter-group interactions). However, due to the rare occurrence of such signals, experimental 
manipulations are critical to rigorously assess the mechanisms underlying their production. Schel et al. 
(2013) exposed wild chimpanzees in the Budongo Forest, Uganda, to realistic moving snake models 
and recorded their vocal behaviour.  
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In line with our framework, it is first critical to show that signalers exposed to model snakes signal 
with a goal with a particular content (I). To infer the goal of the signaler, Schel et al. (2013) 
investigated the cessation of alarm calling in chimpanzees. Theoretically, if the goal of alarm calling is 
to warn others, signalers should persist until all potential receivers are safe. By implementing an 
objective behavioural criterion of “safety” Schel et al. (2013) demonstrate that signal cessation was 
not affected by the safety of the signaler, but instead when receivers were safe (see also Wich and de 
Vries 2006). When alarm calling stopped, receivers were significantly more likely to be safe than 
during the rest of the experimental trial.  
 
Secondly, standardised criteria implemented in developmental child intentionality studies must be 
applied to the signal to assess its voluntary nature and degree of recipient directedness. Schel et al. 
(2013) showed that the production of certain types of alarm calls is influenced by the composition of 
the social audience, as the arrival of friends but not non-friends in the area elicited an increase in the 
production of these calls. Furthermore, analysis of audience checking behaviour, including gaze 
alternation, suggested that signalers monitor and potentially take into account the current behaviour of 
receivers when deciding to produce certain alarm calls. Hence chimpanzee alarm calls also appear 
recipient directed. 
 
The third and final criterion requires that receivers of the signal must regularly respond in a way that is 
in line with the signaler’s presumed intentions. However, such a demonstration does not require that 
the receivers understand and represent the intentions of the signaler; and so does not imply any 
attribution of a mental state to the signaler by the recipient. Currently the data available from the study 
does not sufficiently satisfy this criterion, as Schel et al. (2013) did not directly explore the influence 
of alarm calling on the receiver’s behaviour. Nevertheless, certain observations do suggest that this 
condition may also have been satisfied. When hearing conspecific alarm calls, receivers have been 
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observed to behave in a similar way as when they encounter predators naturally, including bipedal 
scanning behaviour and tree climbing (Slocombe et al. unpublished data, Crockford et al. 2015, see 
also Cheney and Seyfarth 1990). These behavioural observations suggest that the goal of the signaler, 
in terms of warning group members of a threat, has potentially been met. However, more systematic 
comparisons to baseline scanning behaviour indicating that the response was caused by the 
communicated content are still required. 
 
The above example of alarm calling in chimpanzees is not designed to demonstrate intentional 
communication. Instead, it simply serves to illustrate that the proposed framework for assessing 
intentional communication in animals is objective and realisable. Moreover, though there have been 
previous valuable attempts to operationalise intentionality (Leavens et al. 2005, Liebal et al. 2006, 
Vail et al. 2013, Hobaiter and Byrne 2014) these have been predominantly restricted to a single 
modality (but see Hopkins et al. 2007), complicating multi-modal comparisons which are vital to 
understanding intentional communication holistically. Our approach builds on existing work, but 
crucially bridges the current gap that exists between modalities through being applicable to any 
reliably and repeatedly observed communication signal. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
1. The voluntary nature of human communication has long been considered a key, potentially 
unique, feature of human cognition and language. In light of this, much comparative research 
has attempted to unveil analogous or homologous forms of voluntary communication in 
animals as a way to better understand what features are really unique to language and from this 
how the language faculty may have evolved (Hauser et al. 2002, Fitch 2010). However, 
advances in the field have been complicated by the scarcity of convincing evidence of 
voluntary production of animal communication in the vocal domain (Wheeler & Fischer 2012, 
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Rendall and Owren 2013, though see Crockford et al. 2012). This gap in understanding has had 
far reaching impacts regarding the predicted evolutionary route via which language may have 
evolved, namely whether the origins of language were gestural or vocal.  
2. We propose that the problem does not lie only in insufficient data. Additionally, it is bound up 
with a preoccupation with questions about whether voluntary communicative acts in animals 
are produced with the same sorts of cognitively complex intentions thought characteristic of 
human communication – in particular, the intention to modify the mental states of receivers. 
Although mental state attribution and its role in mediating signal production is an important 
component of human intentional communication (Dennett 1983, Crockford et al. 2012), we 
argue that focusing on this alone detracts from the equally informative examples of behaviour. 
Moreover, the assumption that human communication must aim at changing mental states has 
been challenged (Moore, 2015a).  
3. How widely distributed first order intentionality is across the animal kingdom is a key question 
that must be addressed if we are to i) understand the unique qualities of intentionality in 
humans, ii) shed light on the modality and evolutionary route via which language evolved and 
iii) understand more generally the adaptive benefit of intentional signalling in non-human 
animals. 
4. Critically, we provide the necessary framework to address first order intentionality, whether 
analogous or homologous, across modalities and species giving rise to a unified and unbiased 
understanding of the nature of intentional communication in animals.  
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